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1. Introduction
Mobile social networks (MSNs) applications have become popular in our daily lives with the wide usage of
personal hand-held mobile devices. MSNs not only enable people to use their existing online social networks at
anywhere and anytime, but also introduce a myriad of mobility-oriented applications, e.g., location-based services.
As an important application in the multiple MSNs, matchmaking can help users to ﬁnd potential friends who are
sharing the common attributes (e.g., interests). However, such application also raises a number of privacy concerns.
Generally, the two parties involved in the matchmaking don’t wish to reveal any additional information other than
what is necessary. If users’ private information is directly exchanged with each other, the sensitive data can be easily
collected by the malicious users. Malicious users may also lie or even collude to get others’ private information.
Moreover, the wireless medium makes it easy for a malicious user to spoof and inject traﬃc into the mobile social
networks. Therefore, preserving users’ privacy from leakage during the matchmaking becomes an important issue.
In this paper, we propose an recommendation-based matchmaking scheme in multiple MSNs. The scheme in-
cludes three phases: (1) Registration phase: users in MSNs publish their public attributes and public relations for
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Abstract
Mobile social networks (MSNs) enable users to discover and interact with existing and potential friends both in the
cyberspace and in the real world. Although mobile social network applications bring us much convenience, privacy
concerns become the key security issue hindering their wide adoptions. In this paper, we propose a recommendation-
based matchmaking scheme in multiple MSNs, which can help users to ﬁnd their potential friends without disclosing
their private information. The correctness and security analyzing results show that our scheme can resist both semi-
honest and malicious attacks while providing matchmaking functionality against private data leakage.
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potential friends ﬁnding; (2) Recommendation phase: when a user (called initiator) launching a friends ﬁnding re-
quest, the scheme will provide the candidates according to the similarity of their public attributes and public relations.
By this method, the scheme can improve the eﬃciency of friends ﬁnding process; (3) Matchmaking phase: the initia-
tor performs our protocols with the candidates to determine if to make friends. The correctness and security analysis
results show that our scheme can resist malicious and semi-honest adversaries while providing privacy-preserving
matchmaking services in MSNs.
2. Related Work
2.1. Friend Recommendation
Nowell et al.[1] made recommendation of friends by considering only the local features of graph and compared
several local similarity metrics, such as common neighbors, Jaccard’s coeﬃcient, shortest path, and Katz coeﬃcient.
Ruturaj et al.[2] found prospective connections for a speciﬁc user using the friends-of-friends idea to make recommen-
dation in federated networks. Symeonidis et al.[3] incorporated transitive node similarity into global graph features
that captures adequately the missing local graph characteristics and enhance its performance.
Heng et al.[4] proposed a collaboration framework based on local user similarity and global similarity. Vinti et
al.[5] proposed a collaborative ﬁltering framework for friends recommendation based on the interaction intensity and
the adaptive user similarity.
2.2. Matchmaking protocol
Matchmaking protocol is the core component of a matchmaking system. Matchmaking can be described as a
private set intersection (PSI) problem or a private cardinality of set intersection (PCSI) problem. As several solutions
adopted by PSI problems correspond to a PCSI scheme, we focus on the related research about PSI protocols, which
are classiﬁed into three categories as follows:
Agrawal et al.[6] introduced a two party one-way Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocol based on commutative
encryption. The protocol is based on the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman hypothesis(DDH) assumption and has linear com-
plexity, but it doesn’t take the defense to malicious attacks into consideration. Later, Xie et al.[7] extended[6]’s idea.
Except public-key cryptography, there are also some attempts to solve the PSI problem by using simple symmetric-
key approaches. However, these works are often ﬂawed. For example, Shundong et al.[8] proposed to use the XOR
operation as the symmetric commutative function, which sharply reduces the computational overhead.
Freedman et al.[9] proposed a PSI protocol which is based on polynomial evaluation and additively homomorphic
encryption. Since the protocol is one way, it cannot be used in a distributed environment. There are also several
researches sketching privacy-preserving set intersection protocols employing the mathematical properties of polyno-
mials. e.g., Kissner and Song[10] used polynomials to represent multi-sets.
There is another PSI construct which is based on oblivious pseudo-random functions. This approach dates backs
to Freedmane et al.[11]. Revisiting their idea, Hazay and Lindell[12] utilized speciﬁc properties of the Naor-Reingold
PRF in order to achieve high eﬃciency in the presence of both malicious and semi-honest models. Recently, Jarecki
and Liu[13] presented a very eﬃcient protocol for computing a pseudo random function with a committed key (in-
formally, this means that the same key is used in all invocations), leading to an eﬃcient PSI protocol. Afterwards,
Jarecki et al.[14] proposed an adaptive set intersection computation protocol based on oblivious pseudo-random func-
tion. WANG et al.[17] introduced a privacy preserving matchmaking scheme for MSN based on privacy levels, which
can help users to ﬁnd their friends without leaking their privacy information.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Additive Homomorphic Encryption
Let εpk(·) denote the encryption with a key pair (pk, sk). An additive homomorphic encryption scheme εpk supports
the following operations that can be performed without knowledge of the private key:
• Given two encryptions εpk (m1) and εpk (m2), we can eﬃciently compute the encryption of (m1 + m2), denoted
by εpk (m1 + m2) = εpk (m1)+hεpk (m2)
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• Given some constant c and an encryption εpk (m), we can also eﬃciently obtain εpk (cm) = c∗hεpk (m)
This property is satisﬁed by the Paillier encryption or the ElGamal encryption. Our protocol utilizes the Paillier
encryption.
Threshold Decryption. Based on Shoup’s threshold version of RSA[15], Damgard et al.[16] proposed a threshold
version of Paillier’s encryption scheme. Threshold encryption requires a pre-determined number of players to collab-
orate on fully decrypting a message. Any collaboration between fewer than the speciﬁed number of contributors does
not result in a complete decryption.
3.2. Our Attributes Representation Technique
We represent the individual elements of a set as prime numbers which is called prime representation. We utilize
the prime number table Pη that contains η-bit primes. Then denote by ℘ a function to a prime table ℘ : {0, 1}∗ → Pη
and denote by H a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, · · · , l} where l is a constant. However, we can see that the function ℘
is not collision-free and must be accommodated in some way. For that, we deﬁne a process that throws prime numbers
into l buckets, such that each bucket contains at most m elements. Our algorithm is described as:
1.Access to a prime table Pη consisting of η-bit primes;







Brief Analysis. When it is assumed that the function ℘ is uniformly random, the probability that collision does not














In our protocol, because the average number of elements in each bucket is small (e.g., m ≈ 10), the probability that
collision by ℘ occurs in a given bucket is negligible if the size of Pη is suﬃciently large (e.g.,
∣∣∣Pη
∣∣∣ = 220). Moreover,
the size of Pη does not depend on the cardinality of datasets since the problem of large datasets can be addressed by
adding the number of buckets. The set of all 20-bit primes is a good example of Pη.
4. System Design
Our system is designed to help a user (the initiator) to ﬁnd friends in multiple mobile social networks. As there
exist various kinds of relations in the network, each relation can be treated as a single relational network. Every user
has a special status in each single relational network. We utilize a cloud based service to receive and process the
matchmaking requests send by the initiator based on the friends-of-friends linkage and the public attributes similarity,
the service also recommends the candidates to the initiator to perform the matchmaking protocol.
Each user has two basic categories of attributes: public attributes and private attributes. The public attributes are
sent to the registration service to be published while the private attributes are kept by themselves. In our scheme,
every two users determine the private attributes types they can access from each other with the corresponding PAS
before performing the matchmaking protocol. Besides, we ensure that users can’t reveal any additional information
other than what is necessary when interacting with others in the whole matchmaking process.
4.1. System Architecture
Our matchmaking system consists of three components illustrated in ﬁgure 1:
A mobile user is an ordinary hand-held device user in multi-relational social networks. Each user has a set of
attributes. The Policy-Authorize Service (PAS) is used to authorize elements for a given party. The matcher and the
combiner which are assumed to be non-colluding. The matcher and the combiner work together to perform recom-
mending without either of them learning about the association between the users and their attributes or connecting
relations through a privacy preserving protocol.
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Figure 1: System architecture
4.2. Protocols design
Our matchmaking scheme consists of three phases: registration, recommendation, and matching:
Phase 1: Every user registers his network status and public attributes on the cloud service with a specialized
mechanism. After registration, the matcher and combiner will obtain some tables;
Phase 2: Once the matcher receives a matchmaking request from the initiator, it communicates with the com-
biner to perform the recommendation protocol. The initiator will obtain the candidate users to execute the actual
matchmaking protocol in phase 3;
Phase 3: The initiator performs the matchmaking protocol with all the candidates to ﬁnd his potential friends.
4.2.1. Phase 1
Each user in our scheme has a unique ID, a public attributes set, a private attributes set, and a set of friends.




A, · · · , PnA
}




A, · · · , FnA
}
. Before
registration, she calculates the union of her public attributes sets and friend sets respectively: PA = P1A∪P2A∪· · ·∪PnA ={
pa1, pa2, · · · , pama
}
, FA = F1A ∪ F2A ∪ · · · ∪ FnA =
{
fa1, fa2, · · · , fala
}
. Now she can register on the cloud service:
Step 1: Alice encrypts her public attributes (pai) and friends ( fai) with the matcher’s public-key (pkM), and then
with the combiner’s public key (pkC). Probabilistic encryption (e.g., by adding randomized padding) is used to defend
against dictionary attacks. Then she sends all the double-encrypted attributes and friends to the matcher;
Step 2: The matcher picks a random registration ID ridA for her registration, and forwards the double-encrypted
attributes and friends along with the ridA to the combiner. The matcher stores in a table R2U a mapping from ridA to
the ID of Alice AID.
Step 3: Upon receiving the double-encrypted attributes and friends, the combiner decrypts them to reveal ma
attributes and la friends for that registration encrypted by the matcher’s public-key. The combiner picks a random
attribute ID aidAi for each of the i encrypted attributes and a random friend ID f idAi for each of the i encrypted friends.
It sends aidAi and the ith encrypted attribute, f idAi and the ith encrypted friends to the matcher (one at a time). These
messages are mixed with aid/encrypted-attribute pairs, ﬁd/encrypted-friend pairs from other ongoing registrations
so the matcher can’t link them back to which registration (ridA) they are associated with. If enough natural cover
traﬃc doesn’t exist, the combiner can generate cover traﬃc. The combiner stores the set of aidAi associated with the
registration (ridA) in the table R2A, and a reverse mapping from the aidAi to the ridA in table A2R. Similarly, it stores
the set of f idAi associated with the registration (ridA) in the table R2F, and a reverse mapping from the f idAi to the
ridA in table F2R.
Step 4: The matcher, upon receiving each aid/encrypted attribute pair, decrypts the encrypted attribute to reveal
the pain-text attribute pai. At this point, if an equivalent attribute had been stored in table T2A, the matcher puts this
attribute and pai together to construct a set and add ridA in the registration ID item associated with the set; otherwise,
the matcher stores pai associated with ridA. It also stores a reverse-mapping from aid to the plain-text set of equivalent
attributes in table A2T. With the same method, the matcher updates table T2F and F2T.
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The recommendation protocol
Step 1: When the matcher receives Alice’s request, it searches its R2U to obtain her registration ID ridA, then
sends ridA to the combiner;
Step 2: The combiner looks up in its R2F table the associate set { f idAi}la1 of the received ridA, then for each f idAi
it executes the following behaviors:
(a)The combiner sends f idAi to the matcher, the matcher looks up its associate friend fai in table T2F;
(b)The matcher searches fai’s associated registration ID in R2U table, we assume the search result is rid, then the
matcher sends rid to the combiner;
(c)Given the registration ID rid, the combiner can obtain the associated friend ID set by looking up R2F, then it
sends each element of the set to the matcher (one at a time);
(d)The matcher checks its T2F table to ﬁnd out the friends associated with each element in the friend ID set.
Because each friend is symbolized by its user ID, we obtain the friends of Alice’s ith friend fai now.
Step 3: The matcher obtains friends of Alice’s all friends, combining them with some users selected
randomly, we form a user set to join the next ﬁltering;
Step 4: For each user i in the set formed in step 3, the matcher ﬁnds out its corresponding registration ID ridi and
sends it to the combiner;
Step 5: The combiner sets a variable ni = 0 corresponding to ridi to request his equivalent public attribute
numbers with Alice;
Step 6: The combiner looks up the R2A table to obtain the attribute ID sets corresponding to ridA:{aidAi}ma1 , for
each aidAi, it executes the following behaviors:
(a)The combiner sends the aidAi to the matcher. Upon receiving the message, the matcher looks up in table A2T
the plain-text equivalent attribute set associated with that aid. For each attribute in the equivalence set, the
matcher looks up table T2A for its corresponding attribute ID. The matcher unions together these attribute IDs to
construct the response.
(b)The combiner ﬁnds out the registration IDs associated with attribute IDs in the response, if ridi is included in
the registration IDs, ni = ni + 1.
Step 7: The combiner ranks the registration IDs received in step 4 based on their equivalent public attribute
numbers with Alice: ni and sends the registration IDs in the top of the ranked list to the matcher;
Step 8: The matcher looks up the user IDs associated with the registration IDs received in step 7 in table R2U.
Now the matcher obtains the candidate users. It sends the recommendation result to Alice.
Table 1: Recommendation protocol
After each user ﬁnishes registration of public attributes on the registration, the matcher can obtain integrated
tables: R2U, T2A, A2T, T2F and F2T, the combiner can obtain integrated tables: R2A, A2R, R2F, and F2R.
4.2.2. Phase 2
When receiving a matchmaking request from the initiator (e.g. Alice), the cloud service will perform the recom-
mendation protocol shown in Table 1 to provide candidate users for her. Our recommendation scheme takes both the
social relations and similarity of users’ public attributes into account; it ﬁrst utilizes the friends-of-friends linkages to
ﬁlter numerous unrelated users, then ranks the remaining users according to their similarity of public attributes with
Alice, the top n users in the ranked list are considered as candidates. We also select users randomly as candidates to
avoid the locality.
4.2.3. Phase 3
The initiator (Alice) performs the matchmaking protocol with the candidate users. Our protocol contains two parts
where part 1 (Table 2) accomplishes the access authorization of two participants’ private attributes and part 2 (Table
3) realizes the computation of set intersection between Alice and a random candidate user (e.g., Bob). We take the
results of part 1 as inputs of part 2.
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Part 1 The identiﬁcation of accessible attributes
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, PA, PB is
public known names of Alice and Bob;
Step 2: For each single relational network, Alice and Bob execute the following operations:
(a) Alice and Bob separately select a random value: rA∈RZP, rB∈RZP and lets RA ← grA , RB ← grB . Then Alice
sends RA to Bob, Bob sends RB to Alice;
(b) For each element piA j ∈ PiA, Alice selects a c← 1 ∈ GT, then she calculates












. Only if Bob has a correct signature on x from authority PASi. c can be
calculated successfully. As a result, Alice obtains CiA which composed of c. With the same method, PB can obtain
CiB.









Table 2: ACCESSIBLE ATTRIBUTE AUTHORIZATION
Part 2 The computation of set intersection
Setup: We use CA, CB obtained in part 1 as the inputs of Alice and Bob and assume the two attributes sets have
equal size: CA = {a1, a2, · · · , ak}, CB = {b1, b2, · · · , bk}. There is a prime table Pη consisting of η-bit primes and
l buckets containing at most m elements. H is a random hash function: {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, · · · , l}, and ℘ represents a
Map-To-Prime function. εpk(·) denotes a threshold additive homomorphic encryption scheme.
Oﬄine:
Step 1: Alice (resp., Bob) computes H (ai) and ℘(ai) for each ai ∈ CA(resp., H (bi) and ℘(bi) for each bi ∈ CB);
Step 2: For each j = 1, 2, · · · , l, Alice (resp., Bob) computes Aj =∏ j=H(ai)℘ (ai) (resp., Bj =
∏
j=H(bi)℘ (bi));
Step 3: Alice (resp., Bob) chooses random elements r1, r2 (resp., s1, s2) in Z⌊√N/4⌋ for each bucket.
Online:

















) and sends them to Bob (resp., Alice);
Step 2: For each j = 1, 2, · · · , l, each player computes εpk
(






Step 3: For each j = 1, 2, · · · , l, Alice and Bob perform a threshold decryption to obtain (r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B2j ;
Step 4: For each j = 1, 2, · · · , l, each player checks whether ℘(a)2
∣∣∣∣(r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B2j or not for all own
private input a whose bucket index is j. If ℘(a)2 divides (r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j , then a is included in the
intersection CA ∩CB;
Step 5: Alice compares the intersection size |CA ∩CB| with its threshold ε. If |CA ∩CB| > ε, she decides to make
friend with Bob and sends a notiﬁcation message to him.
Table 3: Computation of CA ∩CB
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5. Security Analysis
In this section, we consider the security of our matchmaking process. We ﬁrst prove the correctness. That is, when
all participants are honest. Alice and Bob can correctly compute CA ∩CB in the matchmaking protocol.
Lemma 1. (Correctness) If all participates faithfully follow the protocol, then Alice and Bob can correctly com-
pute CA ∩CB with overwhelming property in the matchmaking protocol.
Proof. When a is an element in the intersection CA ∩ CB, ℘(a) divides Aj and Bj for the bucket j = H (a).
Hence ℘(a)2 divides A2j , B
2
j and (r1 + s1) A
2
j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j . Therefore, each player learns that a is an element in the
intersection.
Assume that a is not an element in the intersection CA ∩CB. We do not consider a is not in CA and not in CB,
since no players try to check the divisibility of ℘(a)2. Without loss of generality, suppose a is in CA, but not in CB.
Then, ℘(a) divides Aj, but does not divide Bj. Hence ℘(a)2 divides A2j , but does not divide B
2
j .
In order that ℘(a)2 does not divide (r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j , ℘(a)
2 should not divide r2 + s2. Since r2 and s2
are chosen randomly in Z⌊√N
/
4
⌋, the probability that ℘(a)2 divides r2 + s2 is 1
/
℘(a)2. It is the probability that Alice




5.1. Security in the matchmaking protocols
We can ﬁnd out that the statuses of two participants in the part 2 of matchmaking protocol are equivalent. We
don’t consider the collusion of the two participants. So we only need to analyze the security in the scenario that one
participant is an adversary (e.g., Bob) and the other is an honest user (e.g., Alice).
Adversary model. The attacker can corrupt some users and eavesdropping any messages sent over channel. We
show that no attribute information for a particular Alice is leaked more than that in the protocol (i.e., CA ∩CB).
Lemma 2. Assume that an additive homomorphic threshold encryption εpk(·) is semantically secure, with over-
whelming probability, any adversary learns no more information than what would be obtained by using the same
private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.








, s1, s2, Bj,
εpk
(




(denoted by DATA-1). Because we have assumed that the additive homomorphic









, we can remove them from DATA-1. After engaging in a threshold decryption, Bob can learns
(r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j . So the remain information is CB, s1, s2, Bj, (r1 + s1) A
2
j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j .
In order that Bob learns any information of Alice, he has to ﬁnd the factor of Aj in the equation (r1 + s1) A2j+
(r2 + s2) B2j = d. Since s1, s2, d and Bj are known values to the adversary, it is equivalent to ﬁnd the factor of an
appropriate value of x in the equation xy + c1x + c2z = c3 (1) for variables x, y and z and constant c1, c2 and c3. The
equation (1) can be substituted by the equation xy + c1z = c2(2).
As far as we know, Equation (2) has ﬁnitely many positive integer solutions but there is no eﬃcient algorithm to
ﬁnd solutions. Hence we believe the following conjecture is true.
For variables x, y, z and given constant c1, c2, there is no eﬃcient algorithm to ﬁnd all solutions for equation (2).
Moreover, since z is chosen at random in Z⌊√N
/
4
⌋, the number of possible values of z is about 2510. Hence one has
to factor about 2510 (c2 − c1z)’s to solve equation (2).
Hence, by this conjecture, with the remain information CB, s1, s2, Bj, (r1 + s1) A2j + (r2 + s2) B
2
j , Bob can’t con-
clude any information about the private inputs of Alice, with overwhelming probability, except for that given by
computing the intersection of their attributes sets.
The execution result of our matchmaking protocol determines that every two participants performing the protocol
can learn their intersection mutually no matter whether they make friends with each other. Thus there exists a potential
attack that several users collude to conclude the initiator’s private attributes set. Assuming the threshold set by the
initiator is ε and the size of the initiator’s private attributes set is k, it needs at least k/(ε − 1) adversaries colluding to
obtain his private attributes set.
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5.2. Complexity Analysis
We used integer multiplications, modular exponentiations (ME), and integer divisions in our protocol, in which,
ME is the most expensive operation. Hence, we analyze and compare the computational complexity based on the
number of MEs.
Each player sends three ciphertexts per bucket. Also each player sends one element to perform a threshold de-
cryption per bucket. Hence, the total number of sent ciphertexts is 8l ≈ 8k/m, where l is the number of buckets, k is
the cardinality of private input sets, and m is a pre-ﬁxed number which is the bound of the number of elements in a
bucket. Therefore, the communication complexity is O(k).
In case of the computational complexity, it is assumed that the threshold Paillier encryption [12] is utilized, which
requires 2 MEs for one encryption and 3 MEs (1 ME for share decryption and 2 MEs for share combining) for a
threshold decryption for each player. Hence, for each bucket, each player requires 6 MEs for encryptions, 2 MEs
for εpk
(




computation using additive homomorphic property and 3 MEs for a threshold
decryption. Therefore, the total operations are 22l ≈ 22k/m MEs, hence, the computational complexity is O(k).
6. Conclusion
Applications of matchmaking can help users to ﬁnd their potential friends, but raise serious privacy leakage issues.
In this paper, we present a privacy preserving matchmaking scheme for multiple MSNs utilizing recommendation
mechanism, which can help users to ﬁnd their potential friends without leakage of their unnecessary private data. In
the future, we plan to create fully distributed matchmaking protocols to extend the application scenarios. Furthermore,
we plan to consider the users’ attributes relations in the development of privacy preserving matchmaking protocols.
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